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ALL IS NOT FAIR IN THE PRIVACY TRADE:
THE SAFE HARBOR AGREEMENT AND THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
Eric Shapiro*
INTRODUCTION
An American company seeking to transfer data from its European
subsidiary back to its headquarters in the United States faces
considerably fewer obstacles than an Australian company engaging in
the same type of information transfer from its European subsidiary
back to its head office in Australia. Both companies are theoretically
subject to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament
("European Privacy Directive"), the terms of which provide for the
interruption of data transmissions if the receiving country is found to
provide protections for the data that are not "adequate."2 In reality,
however, because of the Safe Harbor Agreement between the
European Union ("EU") and the U.S.,3 the American company faces
far fewer obstacles to the transmission.
This Note considers whether the EU has violated its commitments
under the World Trade Organization ("WTO") by holding American
companies to substantially different and lower standards when
judging the "adequacy" of the American privacy regime than it does
companies from Australia and elsewhere in the world. It concludes
that the EU has unfairly favored the U.S. with this different treatment
and thereby discriminated against other member states by holding
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Fordham University, School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Joel R. Reidenberg for his help in selecting the topic and for generously
providing a wealth of advice and suggestions. I would also like to thank my family,
and most especially my children, Michaela and Nicholas, for their encouragement,
love, and patience.
1. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281)
[hereinafter European Privacy Directive], available at http://europa.eu.int/
smartapi/cgi/sga-doc?smartapi celexapi prod! CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=319
95L0046&model=guichett (last visited Jan. 22, 2003).
2. Id. art. 25, 1 1.
3. Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European
Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,666 (July 24, 2000) [hereinafter Safe Harbor].
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them to much higher standards. Thus, the EU's imbalanced handling
of the privacy regimes of different countries violates the WTO rules.
Part I of this Note discusses the European Privacy Directive, its
potential for disrupting trade between the EU and the U.S. and the
Safe Harbor Agreement through which these trading partners sought
to avoid such a result. This part then introduces the WTO and its
dispute resolution mechanisms, examines several WTO decisions and
synthesizes these decisions to ascertain the current standards for
determining whether a country has unfairly favored domestic
products or services.
Part II introduces the cases of Hungary and Australia and asks
whether these countries have grounds under WTO regulations to
challenge the EU's treatment of their privacy regimes as being less
favorable than the treatment accorded the U.S. Part III applies the
interpretative concepts introduced in Part I to the issue of whether a
panel would find that the EU offered different treatment to the U.S.,
in the form of the Safe Harbor Agreement, than it offered to Hungary
and Australia. This part argues that a Panel examining this issue
would use the "comparable in effectiveness" standard and that, under
this standard, the requirements that the EU demanded of the U.S.
under Safe Harbor are different from those that the EU demanded of
Hungary and Australia. The Note concludes that the EU's favorable
treatment of the U.S., as compared to other countries which the EU
has evaluated for adequacy, violates WTO principles.
I. THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE, THE SAFE HARBOR
AGREEMENT, AND THE POTENTIAL FOR A VIOLATION UNDER WTO
PRINCIPLES
The European Privacy Directive provides privacy standards for
data communications among member states.4 The Directive also
prohibits EU member states from transferring data to states which do
not have "adequate" protections in place.5 This Directive created a
particularly acute problem in relation to the United States, a key
European trading partner, as the Constitution, common law and
statutes of the United States provide no broad right to privacy.'
The possibility that the U.S. might be judged to have inadequate
standards for protection of privacy, and that this problem would lead
to interruptions in data flows from the EU to the U.S., led the two
economic powers to seek a compromise.' They achieved accord in the
4. See generally European Privacy Directive, supra Note 1.
5. Id. art. 25,$ 1.
6. Paul M. Schwartz & Joel R. Reidenberg, Data Privacy Law, The Commission
of the European Community 6-12 (1996) Barbara Crutchfield George et al., U.S.
Multinational Employers: Navigating Through the "Safe Harbor" Principles to
Comply With the EU Data Privacy Directive, 38 Am. Bus. L.J. 735,741,746-48 (2001).
7. See Julia M. Fromholz, The European Union Data Privacy Directive, 15
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form of the Safe Harbor Agreement, under which companies would
self-certify to the U.S. Department of Commerce by promising to
meet specific, listed requirements.' The Federal Trade Commission's
("FTC") statutory right to prosecute companies engaging in deceptive
trade practices under the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTCA")
provides an enforcement mechanism,' which is required under the
European Privacy Directive."' This promise of enforcement induced
the European Community to adopt Safe Harbor over the protests of a
majority in the European Parliament and several individual European
governments.1'
The difference between the standards for the interruption of data
transfer under the Safe Harbor Agreement, 2 and those to which the
EU holds other countries, creates the possibility of a violation of the
trade liberalizing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT")3 and the General Agreement on Trade in Services
("GATS"). 4
GATS regulates trade in services; therefore, it has a direct effect on
the protection of privacy relating to electronic data communication 5
and thus to the Safe Harbor Agreement. Under GATS, signatories
offer other signatories Most Favored Nation ("MFN") status for
services." MFN requires that member nations offer "treatment no
less favourable" to one member nation than that offered to all
member nations, unless the member specifically exempts itself from
this requirement according to the GATS rules. 7 If, through the
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 461, 475-76 (2000); Mike Ewing, Comment, The Perfect Storm:
The Safe Harbor and the Directive on Data Protection, 24 Hous. J. Int'l L. 315, 336-7
(2002).
8. Safe Harbor, supra note 3.
9. Id. at 45,667, 45,675-76.
10. European Privacy Directive, supra note 1, art. 22.
11. Letter from John F. Mogg, European Commission, Internal Market Director
General, to Robert LaRussa, Under Secretary for International Trade of the United
States Department of Commerce (Jan. 28, 2000), available at
htip://www.export.gov/safeharbor/EUletterJulyHeader.htm (last visited Mar. 21,
2003) [hereinafter European Commission Director General Letter]; Report on the
Draft Commission on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the Safe Harbour
Privacy Principles (C5-0280/2000-2000/2144(COS)) Committee on Citizens'
Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs (June 22, 2000), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/privacy/docs/adequacy/01 177-02-en.pdf
(last visited Apr. 8, 2003).
12. See infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
13. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I1, 55
U.N.T.S. 188 Ihereinafter GATT].
14. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex IB, 33 I.L.M.
1167 (1994) Ihereinafter GATS].
15. See Stewart A. Baker et al., E-Commerce E-Products and the WTO, 35 Int'l
Law. 5 (2001) (discussing the application of' WTO and GATS principles to e-
commerce).
16. GATS, supra note 14, art. 11:1.
17. Id.
27832003]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
agreement, the EU is offering different, and more favorable,
treatment to the U.S. than that offered to other countries, then the
Safe Harbor Agreement is a violation of GATS by the EU.
A. The European Privacy Directive and the Safe Harbor Agreement
The EU passed the European Privacy Directive, which regulates
transfers of data, in 1995."s The Directive states that "personal data"
is data that refers to an "identifiable person" and that the processing
of data encompasses any "operation ... whether or not by automatic
means" performed upon such data. '9  Under the Directive, EU
member states must assure that data is processed "fairly and
lawfully," and only for "specified, explicit and legitimate purposes. "20
Further processing is permissible only if safeguards assure that the
processing is "adequate, relevant and not excessive" for the purposes
of collection.2' Information must also be accurate and kept no longer
than necessary.22 Furthermore, data may be processed only under
limited circumstances without the subject's permission. 2' The
Directive also contains protections for individuals, including the right
to access data,24 the right to object to the processing of personal data 5
and a judicial remedy if these rights are breached.26 Most important
for the purposes of this Note, the Directive prohibits transfers to
countries without "adequate level[s]" of data protection. 21
I. The Potential for Major Disruptions in Transatlantic Commerce
Under the European Privacy Directive
Europeans and Americans have widely divergent cultural views
about privacy.2" Europeans take a more guarded view of data
18. European Privacy Directive, supra note 1.
19. Id. ch. I, art. 2(a), (b): see Gregory Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory
Goals: The Prospects and Limits of New Approaches to Transatlantic Governance
Through Mutual Recognition and Safe Harbor Agreements. 9 Colurn. J. Eur. L. 29, 60
(2002) [hereinafter Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals] (noting that
"[eixcept for public security, criminal law and related exceptions, [the European
Privacy Directivel covers all processing of all personal data by whatever means").
20. European Privacy Directive. supra note 1. ch. I, § 1, art. 6(a), (h).
21. Id. ch. I1. § i, art. 6(c).
22. Id. ch. I, § 1, art. 6(e).
23. Id. ch. II, § II, art. 7.
24. Id. ch. I1, § IV, art. 12.
25. Id. ch. II, § V1, art. 14.
26. Id. ch. Il1, art. 22: see Shaffer. Reconciling Trade and RegulatorY Goals, supra
note 19, at 60.
27. European Privacy Directive, supra note 1, ch. IV, art. 25, 9 3: see Shaffer,
Reconciling Trade a(d Regulatorv Goals, supra note 19, at 60: Robert E. Schriver,
Note, You Cheated, You Lied: The Safe Harbor Agreement and its Enforcement by the
Federal Trade Coninuission, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 2777, 2788-92 (2002).
28. See Joel R. Reidcnberg, E-Conunerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 Hous. L.
Rev. 717, 719 (2001) [hereinafter Reidenbcrg, Trans-Atlantic Privac, (arguing that
"United States policy lags far behind Ithat of the EUJ and, despite greater public
2784 [Vol. 71
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processing and "generally require the state to take an active role in
protecting the fair treatment of personal information. '29 Europeans
"are wary of the free transfer of personal information and consider
data privacy protection a fundamental human right."3" This
protection of privacy stands in stark contrast to the self-regulatory
American approach. 1 There is no fundamental right to privacy in the
U.S. Constitution, but rather "[t]he Constitutional right to privacy in
the United States relates solely to government intrusion into private
matters. 1 32 Accordingly, American law places greater emphasis on
protecting citizens from the government's interference with their
privacy, than in granting the government powers to protect the
privacy of individuals.33  Rather than announcing broad data
protections, as the European Privacy Directive does, American data
protection law usually is targeted at specific sectors. 4 In contrast to
European practice, no U.S. governmental agency has been specifically
designated to protect citizens' rights to privacy from either the
government or from the private sector.
The European Privacy Directive had the potential to cause
disruptions in transfers of data from the EU to the U.S.3 6  One
commentator has stated that the effect of applying the Directive to
U.S. multinational employers would be "catastrophic. ''1 7  Another
attention, remains relatively stagnant"); Paul M. Schwartz, European Data Protection
Law and Restrictions on International Data Flows, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 471, 472 (1995)
(explaining that the EU's "efforts aim to create strong European protection for
individual privacy"); see also Fromholz, supra note 7, at 470.
29. Schwartz & Reidenberg, supra note 6, at 12.
30. See George et al., supra note 6, at 743.
31. Steven R. Salbu, The European Union Data Privacy Directive and
International Relations, 35 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 655, 666 (2002) (noting that
"[p]rivacy considerations that may be considered negligible in the United States are
taken very seriously by the European Union").
32. Ewing, supra note 7, at 336-37; see George et al., supra note 6, at 747.
33. Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards For Fair Information Practice in the U.S.
Private Sector, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 497, 501-02 (1995) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Data
Protection and the European Privacy Directive]; see also id. at 499 (arguing that "[t]he
driving force behind [American] fair information practice standards is the philosophy
that government should be limited and that a 'marketplace of ideas' allows only
minimal restrictions on flows of information, including personal information"); see
Fromholz, supra note 7, at 470.
34. Schwartz and Reidenberg, supra note 6, at 7: see also George et al., supra note
6. at 737: Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rides
in Cyberspace, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1315, 1331 (2000) (arguing that, in the United States,
"]ljegal rules are relegated to narrowly targeted sectoral protections. For example,
the Video Privacy Protection Act prohibits the disclosure of titles of particular films
rented by a customer at a video store, while viewing habits on the Internet of
streaming video remain unprotected").
35. Schriver, supra note 27 at 2795-2817 (arguing that the FTC can prosecute
companies under FTCA § 5, but only those that have self-certified to the Safe Harbor
Agreement).
36. George et al., supra note 6, at 738.
37. Id.
2003]
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observed that the European Privacy Directive had the potential to
"endanger[] the $350 billion in trade between the U.S. and Europe."3
The Directive could have affected "the daily use American businesses
make of data such as information on resumes, company requests for
credit reports, performance evaluations, information on employee
training, grievances, and disciplinary measures."3" If the Directive had
been implemented, U.S. companies with EU subsidiaries could have
been prevented from moving essential information from one part of
the company to another.
2. The Safe Harbor Agreement
In response to this risk, the EU and the U.S. negotiated the Safe
Harbor Agreement, which provides a way for American companies to
certify to the Federal Trade Commission that they comply with listed
requirements.4" The purpose of the Safe Harbor Agreement is "[t]o
diminish ... uncertainty and provide a more predictable framework
for such data transfers."'" To qualify for Safe Harbor, a
representative of an organization simply fills out a form on the
website of the U.S. Department of Commerce certifying that the
following seven requirements will be met:
(1) Notice-Individuals must be informed in "clear and
conspicuous language" about the "purposes" and "uses" of the
information collected about them and the options and methods
available to limit its use and disclosure;
(2) Choice-Data subjects may prevent information from being
transmitted to a third party or from being used in a manner
inconsistent with the original collection purpose;
(3) Onward Transfer-A party to whom information about a data
subject is transferred must either follow the Safe Harbor Principles or
be subject to the Directive;
(4) Security- "[R]easonable" actions must be taken to prevent loss
or corruption of data;
(5) Data Integrity-Data may only be processed in a way that is
"consistent" with the purpose for which it was collected;
(6) Access-Individuals must have the right to verify personal data,
without excessive price or delay, and the right to have incorrect data
fixed; and
38. Edniund Sanders, U.S. Firms Abstain firon EU Privacy Pact Trade:
Companies Aren't Convinced 'S fe-Harbor' Agreement Would Protect Them from
Europe's Data-Protection Laws, L.A. Times, Jan. 5, 2001, at C3.
39. George et al., supra note 6, at 753.
40. Safe Harbor, supra note 3.
41. Id. at 45,667.
2786 [Vol. 71
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(7) Enforcement-The agreement requires measures, including
sanctions, which are "sufficiently rigorous to ensure compliance."42
The decision to qualify for Safe Harbor is completely voluntary.43
The organization has a choice either to join a privacy program that
adheres to the Principles of the European Privacy Directive, or to
develop its own.44 Enforcement authority comes either from the
FTCA, section 5, which prohibits "unfair" and "deceptive" acts, or
from "another law or regulation. '45 The agreement also offers the
possibility of qualification for "organizations subject to a statutory,
regulatory, administrative or other body of law (or of rules) that
effectively protects personal privacy. "46
3. Difficulties in Negotiating the Safe Harbor
The Safe Harbor Agreement was difficult to negotiate and faced
strenuous resistance from both sides.47 The European Parliament
expressed grave concerns about many aspects of the draft of the
agreement." Difficult issues included "access rights and enforcement
in the United States.
49
42. Id. at 45,667-68. Safe Harbor Letter from Ambassador Aaron, available at
http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/ecom/aaron419.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2003); see, e.g.,
James M. Assey, Jr. & Demetrios A. Eleftheriou, The EU-U.S. Privacy Safe Harbor:
Smooth Sailing Or Troubled Waters?, 9 CommLaw Conspectus 145, 151-54 (2001);
Jordan M. Blanke, "Safe Harbor" and the European Union's Directive on Data
Protection, 11 AIb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 57, 77-81 (2000); Salbu, supra note 31, at 680-81
(describing the process for subscribing to Safe Harbor); Angela Vitale, Note, The EU
Privacy Directive and the Resulting Safe Harbor: The Negative Effects on U.S.
Legislation Concerning Privacy on the Internet, 35 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 321, 336-40
(2002).
43. Safe Harbor, supra note 3, at 45.667: Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note 42, at
151 (stating that "U.S. companies are not required to participate in the Safe
Harbor"): Blanke, supra note 42, at 77-78.
44. Safe Harbor, supra note 3, at 45,666-67.
45. Id. One of the issues related to Safe Harbor is whether or not the agreement
actually provides enforcement mechanisms as required under the Directive. See
Schriver, supra note 27 (arguing that the FTC's enforcement powers provide a
credible threat of enforcement). But see The EU Data Protection Directive:
Implications for the U.S. Privacy Debate: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 8, 2001) (Prepared Statement of Joel R.
Reidenberg, Professor of Law and Director of the Graduate Program, Fordham
University School of Law) § 3(b), [hereinafter Reidenberg Testimony], available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/hearings/03082001 Hearing49/print.htm (last
visited March 28, 2003)(arguing that "the underlying legal authority of the FTC to
enforce the Safe Harbor is questionable"); Reidenberg, Trans-Atlantic Privacy, supra
note 28, at 745-46.
46. Safe Harbor, supra note 3, at 45,667.
47. Reidenberg, Trans-Atlantic Privacy, supra note 28, at 738 (stating that the
negotiations on Safe Harbor were "lengthy and troubled"); Salbu, supra note 31, at
679-80 (noting that "[iimplementation and enforcement were major concerns"
expressed by EU countries).
48. European Parliament Report on the Draft Commission Decision on the
2003] 2787
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The Europeans faced a major political conflict. Although they
knew that the U.S. was not likely to pass new legislation to guarantee
privacy rights, European regulators did not want to interrupt data
flows to and from the U.S." The true purpose of the Safe Harbor
from the European perspective was as "a mechanism to delay facing
tough decisions about international privacy. ' 5 1
The Safe Harbor Agreement also contains serious administrative
law defects. 2 First, Safe Harbor did not exist when the European
Privacy Directive was passed, making it impossible for Safe Harbor to
have been one of the "prevailing rules of law" used to determine
adequacy." Additionally, under the European Privacy Directive, a
remedy can only be negotiated by the European Commission after a
finding that a country lacks "adequate" protection 4 -a finding that
has never been made in relation to the United States.5 5
4. Problems with the Safe Harbor Agreement
a. The European Perspective
The latest European Commission Staff Working Paper, which
evaluated the present status of the Safe Harbor Agreement for the
European Parliament, listed various faults in the operation of the
agreement5 ' The Paper first noted that many companies that had
Adequacy of' the Protection Provided by the Sal'e Harbour Privacy Principles (June
22, 2000) (C5-0280/2000-2000/2144(COS)), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internal_market/privacy/docs/adequacy/01 177-02.pdf (Apr. 8, 2003) I hereinafter
Parliament Report] (presenting concerns about the tact that the agreement is not a
"legislative" approach, the two different levels ol protection for EU and U.S. citizens.,
the lack of certainty in relation to obtaining compensation for violation of safe harbor
principles, and the fact that only firms under the authority of the FTC and
Department of' Transportation are covered, thereby excluding banking and
telecommunications): see also Salbu, supra note 31, at 679.
49. Reidenberg Testimony, supra note 45, § 3, 9 2: see Reidenberg, Trans-Atlantic
Privacy, supra note 28, at 744-46.
50. Reidenberg Testimony. supra note 45, § 3(a), 91 1; Reidenberg, Trans-Atlantic
Privacy, supra note 28, at 739.
51. Reidenberg Testimony, supra note 45, § 3(a), 91 1; Reidenberg, Trans-Atlantic
Privacy, supra note 28, at 739 (stating that "the approval was an important short-term
political victory for both the United States and the European Commission").
52. Reidenberg Testimony, supra note 45, at 3(b). 91 5.
53. Id. (internal quotation omitted); see Reidenberg, Trans-Atlantic Privacy, supra
note 28, at 741-42.
54. Reidenberg Testimony, supra note 45, § 3(b), 91 5: Reidenberg, Trai.s-Atlantic
Privacy, supra note 28, at 742.
55. Reidenberg Testimony, supra note 45, § 3(b), 1 5: Reidenberg, Trans-Atlantic
Privacy, supra note 28, at 742.
56. Commission Stal'[' Working Paper: The Application of' Commission Decision
520/2000/EC of 26 July 2000,Pursuant to Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament
and of' the Council on the Adequate Protection of' Personal Data Provided by the
Sale Harbour Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by
2788 [Vol. 71
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self-certified to the Department of Commerce had not published a
privacy policy as required by the Safe Harbor Principles) 7
Additionally, fewer than half of the posted privacy statements actually
contain all seven of the Safe Harbor Principles." Also, the Paper
pointed out a "lack of clarity" for enforcing rights, because some
policies do not state what "sensitive data '"" is or how to contact the
enforcement agency. ' Thus, "individuals may not know what rules
apply to the processing [of] their data, or how they can exercise their
legitimate rights." 1 The Commission report also expressed doubts as
to "the capacity [of the U.S. government] to apply sanctions rigorous
enough to ensure compliance with the Principles."62 The report spoke
of the "need to be able to rely on a range of sanctions." 3 Specifically
the report stated that "publicity for findings of non-compliance and
the requirement to delete data in certain circumstances" must be part
of the enforcement arsenal. 4 The Commission found, however, that
"not all such bodies undertake to publicise their findings." 5 Although
the Report does not state explicitly that the required enforcement
mechanisms are lacking, such a conclusion is implied.
Furthermore, the report found that the EU may have weakened its
own standards on data protection through the acceptance of the Safe
Harbor. First, "[t]he Safe Harbor exempts public record
information," although this information is generally covered under
the European Privacy Directive. 6 The Safe Harbor Agreement also
does not mandate access to a remedy of comparable effectiveness to
those guaranteed by the European Privacy Directive. The latter
assures the victim the right to legal redress, including damages."
While the U.S. Department of Commerce asserts that similar redress
the US Department of Commerce (Feb. 13, 2002), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internalnr, imrket/en/dataprot/adequacy/02-196-en.pdf (last
visited Jan. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Safe Harbor Commission Staff Working Paper].
57. Id. at 8.
58. Id. at 9.
59. The Safe Harbor Agreement states that sensitive data is "personal
information specifying medical or health conditions, racial or ethnic origin, political
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership or information
specifying the sex life of the individual" and that data subjects " must ... give[]
affirmative or explicit (opt in) choice if the information is to be disclosed to a third
party or used for a purpose other than those for which it was originally collected."
Safe Harbor, supra note 3, at 45,668.
60. Safe Harbor Commission Staff Working Paper, supra note 56, at 9.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 10.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Reidenberg Testimony, supra note 45. § 3(d): Reidenberg, Trans-Atlantic
Privacy, supra note 28, at 744.
67. European Privacy Directive, supra note 1, ch. Ill, art. 22.
20031 2789
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is available through U.S. common law tort actions, such assertions are
not borne out in practice.'"
As early as February of 2000, Article 29 and Article 31 Working
Parties noted the potential for unfair discrimination." The Working
Parties found that third countries were showing "interest ... in the
implementation of Articles 25 and 26 of the Directive and in
particular in the effects of findings of 'adequacy' under Article
25(6)." Both entities mentioned that third countries had expressed
"concerns" about greater severity of EU enforcement against third
countries than against EU data controllers and that there could be
"discrimination among the entities from different third countries."7
b. The U.S. Perspective
On the U.S. side, certain industry pundits have found that "the deal
has been largely ignored by U.S. companies."72 That President Bush
contemplated withdrawing from the agreement at one point only
reinforces this conclusion.73 Furthermore, the U.S. Treasury and
Commerce Department reportedly "complained in a letter to the EU
that the measure is a threat to transatlantic e-commerce, and could
burden website operators with red tape."74 At Congressional hearings
on the subject, Members asked whether the "Department of
68. See Reidenberg Testimony, supra note 45, § 3(d) (stating that "the
applicability of these tort actions to data processing and information privacy has
never been established by U.S. courts and is, at present, purely theoretical");
Reidenberg, Trans-Atlantic Privacy, supra note 28, at 744-45.
69. Text on Non-Discrimination Adopted by the Article 29 Working Party on 3rd
of February 2000, available at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/nondiscrim
Art29FebOO.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2003)1hereinafter Article 29 Working Party-
Feb. 20001; Text on Non-Discrimination Adopted by the Article 31 Committee on
31st of May 2000, available at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/nondiscrim
Art3lMayOO.htm (last visited January 22, 2003) [hereinafter Article 29 Working
Party-May 2000]. A "Working Party" is a group composed of the national data
protectin commissioners. The Party gives an opinion as to whether the level of
national protection that a third country offers is adequate. Europa-internal Market-
Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data in Third
Countries, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/privacy/adequacy-en.htm.
70. Article 29 Working Party-Feb. 2000, supra note 69, $ 1. A "third country" is
a country that is not a member of the EU.
71. Id.
72. Paul Thibodeau, U.S. Firms Skipping 'Safe Harbor': About 200 Companies
Have Signed Up; European Privacy Enforcement Lacking, Computerworld, June 3,
2002, available at 2002 WL 2205393; see Data Overload, Fin. Times, May 10, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 20298970 (noting that Safe Harbor "has had only a limited
success"); Cherise M. Valles, Setting the Course on Data Privacy as U.S. Firms
Hesitate, EU Gets Set to Enforce its Rules an Alternative Voice, Int'l Herald Trib., May
28, 2001, available at 2001 WL 4855131 (noting also that many of the U.S. companies
registering for Safe Harbor are in the privacy business themselves).
73. Charles Arthur, Now Bush Wants to Scrap Deal on Internet Privacy, Indep.
(London), Mar. 31, 2001, available at 2001 WL 17873019.
74. Id.
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Commerce [was] duped into supporting the Safe Harbor. '75  One
leading U.S. privacy expert has said that the agreement is
"unworkable for both sides and will not alleviate the issues of weak
American privacy protection.1 7' A Wall Street Journal editorial
summed up the view of many in business by providing a market-based
argument against both the Directive and Safe Harbor.7  The editorial
argued that "the surrendering of personal data is, initially, a voluntary
act between consenting adults. 7' The editorial concluded that U.S.
industry has begun to show concern over privacy because consumers
are concerned, and thus the sites could best attract them by providing
a privacy policy.79
There are many serious problems with Safe Harbor. Enforcement
is a major problem on the U.S. side. Section 5 of the FTCA may not
provide the FTC with jurisdiction to enforce Safe Harbor."'
Additionally, even if the FTC has jurisdiction, it is not clear that,
based upon the agency's past performance, it would pursue those who
commit privacy infractions." Furthermore, there is a question as to
whether U.S. tax dollars should be used to provide greater protection
to the privacy rights of Europeans than to those of Americans. 2
Lastly, few companies have joined the Safe Harbor, 3 and most of
these are not Fortune 500 companies. This fact indicates that the Safe
Harbor framework has not been accepted in the U.S. 4
Nonetheless, the U.S. and the EU have ratified the Safe Harbor
Agreement and at least pay lip service to its continued vitality. 5 The
Safe Harbor Agreement, however, may violate the international
trading regime now governed by the WTO."6 The next section
introduces and examines the WTO.
75. Rep. Billy Tauzin (R-LA) Statement on EU Privacy Directive, Mar. 8, 2001
(questioning the "legal status" of Safe Harbor), available at
http://www.techlawjournal.com/privacy/20010308tauzin.asp (last visited Apr. 8, 2003).
76. See Reidenberg Testimony, supra note 45, § 3.
77. Editorial, Review & Outlook: Adequate Protection, Wall St. J. Europe, Feb.
16, 2001, available at 2001 WL-WSJE 2843196.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Reidenberg Testimony, supra note 45, § 3(b) (arguing that "the assertion
by the Department of Commerce and the FTC that the Safe Harbor comes within the
Section 5 jurisdiction is a radical departure from the stated legislative purposes of the
statute and in direct opposition to the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of
Section 5 authority"). But see Schriver, supra note 27 (arguing that Article 5 provides
the FTC with the necessary authority to enforce Safe Harbor).
81. Reidenberg Testimony, supra note 45, § 3(d).
82. 1d.
83. There were 316 companies listed on the Safe Harbor website on March 21,
2003. Safe Harbor Website, at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/shdocuments.html.
84. Reidenberg Testimony, supra note 45, § 3(d) (noting the "unenthusiastic
reception" of Safe Harbor).
85. See Safe Harbor Commission Staff Working Paper, supra note 56, at 2 (noting
that '"[all the elements of the Safe Harbour arrangement are in place").
86. Gregory Shaffer argues that WTO rules would not have helped the U.S. to
2003] 2791
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
B. The World Trade Organization
1. Creation and Dispute Resolution Process
The WTO was created in 1995 as a product of the 1986-1994
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 7
Among other things, the WTO administers trade agreements, acts as a
forum for trade negotiations, and settles trade disputes." While the
GATT agreement covered only trade in goods, the newer GATS
agreement covers services including banking, insurance,
telecommunications, tourism, and transportation."' Thus, the GATS
agreement is relevant to the regulation of privacy regimes, as many of
the sectors covered by GATS transmit data across international
borders."
defend itself against the European Privacy Directive. Gregory Shaffer, Globalization
and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up
of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 Yale J. Int'l L. 1, 49-51 (2000) [hereinafter Shaffer,
Globalization I. He argues that if' the EU banned only data transfers to the U.S., but
not to other, equally inadequate countries, then the U.S. might have a claim based on
a violation of the most-favored nation clause in article II of GATS. Id. at 49-50.
However, Shaffer argues that the U.S. would not prevail because (1) the EU
Directive applies equally to all countries, (2) the EU has a genuine public policy
purpose which is specifically provided for in the GATS agreement under Article XIV
("the privacy of individuals") and (3) a WTO Panel would look more to the process
by which the EU examines foreign privacy protections than to the balance between
privacy and trade. Id. at 49-51 (emphasis omitted). As I will argue, the case for a
finding of improper or unreasonable discrimination is much stronger under Safe
Harbor, as Safe Harbor is an agreement offering special treatment only to the United
States. For another discussion of the impact of the WTO on the European Privacy
Directive, see Peter P. Swire & Robert E. Litan, None of Your Business: World Data
Flows, Electronic Commerce, and the European Privacy Directive, 188-96 (1998)
(arguing that in the context of the European Privacy Directive, the WTO's
involvement in privacy issues will be heavily dependent on the facts of a given case,
and that the WTO will have a more useful role in preventing a privacy regime from
being used for protectionism): see also Kevin Bloss, Note, Raising Or Razing the e-
Curtain?: The EU Directive on the Protection of Personal Data, 9 Minn. J. Global
Trade 645, 655-60 (2000) (arguing that because of the European Privacy Directive,
the EU might have violated the EU's Most Favored Nation obligation under GATT
or GATS, but that it would be more difficult for the U.S. to win under GATS because
this agreement has an exception for privacy).
87. The WTO in Brief: Part I: The Multilateral Trading System-Past, Present
and Future, t www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis e/inbriefe/inbr01_e.htm, (last
visited Mar. 21, 2003).
88. The WTO in Brief: Part 2: The Organization, at www.wto.org/englishl/
thewto e/whatis e/inbrief e/inbr02 e.htm, (last visited Mar. 21, 2003).
89. The WTO in Brief: Part 3: The WTO Agreements, at www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief e/inbr03_e.htm, (last visited Mar. 21, 2003).
9). See Shaffer, Globalization, supra note 86, at 47-48. Shaffer notes that the
"threshold issue" is whether data covered by the European Privacy Directive is
covered by GATS or GATT. The article states that the key is whether the data
transferred refers to sales of goods or services. It argues that since most data
transmitted between Europe and the U.S. is transmitted electronically and thus is a
non-standard product classified as a service, "Itlo the extent that personal data is a
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The purpose of the WTO is to facilitate world trade by removing
barriers to the movement of goods and services." Reflecting this
purpose, the GATT and GATS agreements include specific provisions
that prohibit countries from discriminating against foreign goods and
services through outright prohibition, greater tariffs, or differential
regulatory treatment. The mechanisms through which the WTO
accomplishes this goal include the principle of "most favored nation"
status, which requires that the treatment accorded to one country be
accorded to all members of the WTO;12 "like product," under which
members must give the same treatment to imported goods as they do
to domestic goods;9 3 treatment no less favorable, which means that
there must be a "competitive playing field;"' 4 and "comparable in
effectiveness'5--all of which involve a comparison of the treatment
afforded imported products or services to that afforded domestic
products or services.
One important function of the WTO is that it provides a forum for
countries to settle trade disputes arising under WTO agreements or
treaties." The dispute settlement process provides independent
experts who interpret agreements and the commitments made by
member countries.'7  A panel consisting of legal experts hears
complaints, evaluates evidence, makes findings of fact, and renders
legal judgments.'" There is also an appellate level-the Appellate
non-standardized product, its transfer should thus be covered under GATS, and not
GATT 1994." Id.
91. The WTO in Brief. at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis_e/
inbrief c/inbr00 e.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2003).
92. GATS, supra note 14, art. It GATT, supra note 13, art. I. See Baker et al.,
supra note 15, at 7; Robert J. Girouard, Note, Water Export Restrictions: A Case
Study Of WTO Dispute Settlement Strategies and Outcomes, 15 Geo. Int'l. Envtl. L.
Rev. 247, 254 (2003) (stating that under most-favored nation "a WTO member
agreeing to a trade concession with another member or non-member extends that
concession to all other WTO members").
93. Won Mog Choi, Overcoming the "Aim and Effect" Theory: Interpretation of
the "Like Product" in GATT Article Ill. 8 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 107, 107
(2002) ("Article Ill ... requires WTO members to accord national treatment to
imported products."); Edward S. Tsai, "Like" is a Four-Letter Word-GATT Article
Ill's "Like Product" Conundrum, 17 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 26, 28 (1999) ("Article Ill
protects imports from governmental measures which protect domestic goods through
the imposition of unfair competitive conditions that favor domestic producers.").
94. Raj Bhala, The Bananas War, 31 McGeorge L. Rev. 839, 916 (2000) (noting
that the Panel in the Bananas case held that treatment no less favorable "meant not
just formal equality, but also equality of competitive conditions").
95. See infra notes 136-62 and accompanying text.
96. See Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 Harv.
Int'l L. J. 333, 336-39 (1999) (providing an explanation of the purposes and
functioning of the WTO dispute resolution process).
97. See id.: Tracy P. Varghese, The WTO's Shrimp-Turtle Decisions: The
Extraterritorial Enforcement of U.S. Environmental Policy via Unilateral Trade
Embargoes, 8 Envtl. Law. 421, 426-28 (2002) (explaining the functioning of the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding and the Dispute Settlement Body).
98. See Trading into the Future: Introduction to the WTO: Settling Disputes: The
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Body-for appeals on legal grounds.9 These dispute-settling bodies
provide a potential forum for a country to challenge the EU's
treatment of the U.S. privacy regime under Safe Harbor as
preferential to the U.S.
Certain provisions in the WTO agreements--GATT and
GATS-provide a foundation for a legal challenge to the Safe Harbor
Agreement. The concept of "like product" or "like service," which
arises in relation to GATT Article 1:1 and GATS Article II:1-on
Most Favored Nation-and GATT Article III and GATS Article
XVII, provide possible tools for comparing privacy regimes. "Like
product" has been interpreted under GATT cases referring to goods,
but more recent Panel and Appellate Body reports and decisions have
extrapolated the same reasoning to services under GATS.'Y0 The
relevant language for the concept in the GATT and GATS is
similar."'
The privacy regimes of the different countries may be analogized to
products or services, which may or may not be "like." In order to
analyze how a panel might view this issue, this section next considers
the more significant cases in which panels have analyzed the concept
of likeness of products under GATT.
WTO's Most Individual Contribution, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-
e/whatis e/tif e/displ-e.htm (last visited Mar. 1,2003).
99. Varghese, supra note 97, at 426-27.
100. See generally European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/R/USA (May 1997), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/G EN-searchResult.asp?RN=0&searchtype=browse&qI =%
28@metaSymbol+WTODS*+and+(R+or+RW)+and+not+(AB+or+ARB) %29+%26
+%28@DocDate+>=+ 1997/5/1%29+%26+ %28@DocDate+<=+ 1997/5/31%29
[hereinafter Bananas].
101. GATF art. 1:1 states that "any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties." GATT,
supra note 13, art. 1:1. The relevant language in GATS Article 11:1 states that "each
Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service
suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favourable than that it accords to
like services and service suppliers of any other country." GATS, supra note 14, art.
11:1.
The term "like-product" is used in GATT Article 111:2, which states that
"[t]he products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of
any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to like products of national origin." GATT, supra note 13, art. 111:2
(emphasis added). The purpose of this article is to prevent countries from using
"internal taxes and other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied
directly or indirectly to like products of national origin." Id. art. 111:1. This concept is
mirrored in GATS Article XVII which holds that "each Member shall accord to
services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures
affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its
own like services and service suppliers." GATS, supra Note 14, art. XVII:I.
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Because the issue under consideration has to do with trade in
services, this section first discusses the Bananas case,)2 which
analyzed the relation between GATT and GATS. The Bananas panel
applied the concept of "treatment no less favourable," and provided
clarification for judging when rules controlling service providers offer
unfair protection to domestic providers."" This section then discusses
the Shrimp-Turtle cases," 4  which detailed and implemented the
"comparable in effectiveness" standard, providing information for
comparing regulatory systems and for determining when a system
meets the requirements for an exception to the prohibition on product
embargoes.'"5  Finally, this section examines the "like-product"
standard, which requires that countries give the same regulatory and
tax treatment to foreign and domestic products which are similar or
which serve the same purposes.' 6 This standard was developed under
the Japan- Taxes"7 and Asbestos"" cases.
2. The Bananas Case: From GATT to GATS and the "Treatment No
Less Favorable" Standard
The search for WTO precedents analogous to a comparison of
privacy regimes begins with European Communities -Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas ("Bananas"),"'9 a case
which introduces a way to compare government regulatory treatment
under GATS.'" Bananas was one of the first WTO cases brought-at
102. Bananas, supra note 100; see Bhala, supra note 94 (providing an excellent
overview of case).
103. Bananas, supra note 100, at 7.299-7.304, 7.349.
104. United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia-Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS58/AB/RW (October 2001), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
G EN search Result.asp? RN 0&searchtype=browse&ql =%28@metaSymbol+WTu
DS*+and+AB+and+(R+or+RW) %29+%26+%28@DocDate+>=+2001/10/1%29+%
26+%28@DocDate+<=+2001/10/31%29 [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle II, Appellate
Body].
105. See infra notes 160-75 and accompanying text.
106. Japan -Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages- Report of the Appellate Body 15-17,
WT/DS8/AB/R. WT/DSIO/AB/R, WT/DS/Il/AB/R (October 1996), available at
h ttp://docsonline.wto.org/G EN-search Result.asp? RN=0&search type=browse&q 1 =%
28@metaSymbol+WTODS*+and+A B+and+(R+or+RW) %29+%26+%28@Doc Dat
e-+>=+ 1996/1/1 %29+%26+ %28@DocDate+<=+ 1996/12/31%29 ]hereinafter Japan-
Taxes]; see Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation:
Requiem For an "Aim and Effects" Test, 32 Int'l Law. 619, 620 (1998).
107. Japan-Taxes, supra note 106.
108. European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, Appellate Body Report and Panel Report, WT/DS 135/AB/R
(March 12, 2001), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN-searchResult.asp?R
N=0&searchtype=browse&q I =%28@nietaSymbol+WTiiDS*+and+AB+and+(R+or
+RW) %29+%26+%28@DocDate+>=+2001/3/1%29+ %26+%28@DocDate+<=+20
01/3/31 %29 Ihereinafter Asbestos].
109. Bananas, supra note 100.
110. Id. at 7.189, 7.221, 7.303.
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least partially-under GATS.' The Bananas case involved a regime
implemented by the EU to facilitate a common market for bananas."
2
This common regime replaced the bilateral agreements that individual
EU countries had utilized for importing bananas."3 Most of these
bananas came from developing countries in Africa and the Caribbean
and Pacific regions ("ACP")."14 The EU reorganized these bilateral
agreements and set up a system in which different licensing
preferences were divided among "operators" that were either
importers or distributors."' The case was brought to the WTO
because the system by which distributors were allocated various types
of licenses seemed to favor EC or ACP companies over competitors
in Latin America and the U.S.'"
The Panel first examined the interaction between GATT and
GATS." 7 The Panel held that GATT and GATS are not mutually
exclusive and that even if an issue has a GATT component, GATS
may still apply.'"
The Panel next looked at the standard of "treatment no less
favourable" under GATS 11:1, holding that GATSXVII should define
the standard."'  Article XVII contains greater elaboration than
Article 11:1, and, in past analyses by panels examining GATT Article
II1, had been interpreted as "concerned with conditions of
competition between like domestic and imported products on internal
markets."'' The issue was whether formal discrimination among
foreign service providers was necessary, or simply an "un-level
competitive playing field."' 2' The Panel found that Article II should
not be interpreted so narrowly as to "require only formally identical
treatment."' 12 2  The Panel then concluded that the requirement of
"treatment no less favourable" meant "no less favourable conditions
of competition.' ' 23 Therefore, the Panel interpreted GATS as holding
that "formal equality alone" is not enough; what is needed is a level
playing field. 124
111. Id. at IV.600.
112. Id. at 111.1 - 111.4.
113. Bhala, supra note 94, at 848.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 858-64.
116. Bananas, supra note 100, at IV.600.
117. Id. at 7.278.
118. Id. at 7.282.
119. Id. at 7.299.
120. Id. at 7.3(02.
121. Bhala, supra note 94, at 916 (stating that the standard was that unfair
discrimination occurred if "some service suppliers were in a better competitive
position than others").
122. Bananas, supra note 100, at 7.303.
123. Id. at 7.3(04.
124. Bhala, supra note 94, at 917.
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Having established a definition for "treatment no less favourable,"
the Panel then stated the requirements for a finding of a breach of
Article XVII. The Panel held that the country had to
undertake[] a commitment in a relevant sector and mode of
supply; .. adopt[] or appl[y] a measure affecting the supply of
services in that sector and/or mode of supply; and .. accord[] to
service suppliers of any other Member treatment less favourable
than that it accords to the EC's own like service suppliers.' 25
The difficulty in this case was that the operator category rules seemed,
on the surface, to offer identical treatment to domestic and foreign
companies. 2 ' The Panel noted that, under Article XVII, "formally
identical treatment may, nevertheless, be considered to be less
favourable treatment if it adversely modifies conditions of
competition for foreign services or service suppliers."' 27 Although
different operators could buy and sell licenses and thus, theoretically,
have equal access, the Bananas Panel found unfairness as the regime
first allocated licenses and other privileges to the EC operators.2
Therefore, the Panel concluded that the operator category rules
favored service suppliers from the European Community.'29
The Panel also rejected the EC's argument that the market
allocation had not changed radically, finding that "a lack of significant
change in market share does not demonstrate that there has not been
a significant change in the conditions of competition."'" Thus, visible
changes in market share are not required for a finding of less
favorable treatment.' The Panel findings-that GATS applied to a
comparison of government regulatory regimes, that "treatment no less
favorable" did not require formally identical treatment and that less
favorable treatment does not require significant market changes-are
relevant to a panel's determination of whether the EU's treatment of
the U.S. privacy regime under Safe Harbor violates the WTO
agreements.
125. Bananas, supra note 100, at 7.375.
126. Id. at 7.322.
127. Id. at 7.327.
128. Id. The unfairness came from the fact that the EC operators were favored by
being given tariff quota rents. Id. at 7.336; see Aisha L. Joseph, Comment, The
Banana Split: Has the Stalemate Been Broken in the WTO Banana Dispute? The
Global Trade Community's "A-Peel" for Justice, 24 Fordham Int'l L.J. 744, 775 (2000)
(arguing that "that the allocation of quota shares to some Member States having a
substantial interest in supplying the EU with bananas was inconsistent with GATT
Article XIII obligations").
129. Bananas, supra note 100, at 7.335.
130. Id. at 7.337.
131. ld.
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3. Shrimp-Turtle: Analyzing a National Regulatory Regime Under
the "Comparable in Effectiveness" Standard
While Bananas articulated the concept of "treatment no less
favorable" and illustrates its importance, 32 no cases have yet been
decided in which a national regulatory regime for services has been
evaluated under this standard. The Appellate Body in Shrimp-Turtle
II, however, undertook this analysis in evaluating a product regulatory
regime 33 and, therefore, provides the closest analogy to the issue of
privacy regimes under Safe Harbor. Shrimp-Turtle examines the
question of whether different treatment of domestic and foreign
service providers by a national regulatory regime constitutes unfair
discrimination under the WTO.
The most important contribution of the Shrimp-Turtle cases to the
analysis of privacy regimes under Safe Harbor and other privacy
regimes is its examination of "comparable in effectiveness." 13 4 This
case illustrates both the importance of this standard and its
application to national regulatory regimes. The case also provides
clarification on the exceptions to the WTO prohibitions on disparate
treatment in order to protect "human, animal or plant life or
health."'35 Additionally, Shrimp-Turtle helps to analyze the efforts
made by the country imposing the restrictions in order to decide
whether or not these are applied similarly to all countries affected.
The final decision in the Shrimp-Turtle cases used the "comparable
in effectiveness" standard to decide whether or not a regulatory
regime that offered conditional access to a market based upon a
foreign country's meeting certain requirements, violated WTO
standards. 3 ' The decision emphasized that, rather than looking first
to the effect of the regulatory restrictions on the multilateral trading
regime, a panel must look to whether the country's actions fall into
one of the delineated exceptions. The decision also highlighted the
importance of negotiation and flexibility. The Appellate Body
favored a regulation that allowed qualifying countries to follow rules
and procedures with essentially the same regulatory effect, rather
than one which forced implementation of rules and procedures
identical to those of the regulating country.37
The conflict that would lead to the WTO case began when the U.S.
passed section 609 of Public Law 101-162,3' which called for
restrictions on imports of shrimp from countries which were not
132. See supra notes 119-32 and accompanying text.
133. Shrimp-Turtle 11, Appellate Body, supra note 104.
134. See infra notes 173-81 and accompanying text.
135. GATF, supra note 13, art. XX-1 (b).
136. Shrimp-Turtle I, Appellate Body, supra note 104, '9$l 135-44.
137. Id. $$ 135-50.
138. Pub. L. No. 101-162, 103 Stat 988 (1989).
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certified by the U.S. as meeting criteria for the protection of
endangered turtles. 3 9 To qualify, countries had to implement a
program using either turtle excluder devices ("TED"s) approved by
the United States National Marine Fisheries Service, or a device that
was "comparable in effectiveness." An enforcement program also
had to be put into effect.4 " The U.S. then embargoed shrimp from
countries that did not use the newly-required methods for preventing
the inadvertent killing of turtles.
Malaysia and other countries brought a complaint against the U.S.
under the WTO, alleging both that the U.S. embargo of their shrimp
catch violated GATT Article XI and that the embargo did not qualify
as an exception under GATT Article XX. 4'
Shrimp-Turtle encompassed two different phases. In the first,
("Shrimp I"), heard in 1998, the Appellate Body found the U.S.
system for regulating imports of shrimp to be discriminatory.'42 In the
second ("Shrimp II"), decided in 2001, the Appellate Body found that
the revised American regulatory system for shrimp importation did
allow for embargoes without violating WTO principles. 43
The Panel in Shrimp I found that the two sets of countries-those
certified and those denied certification-had the same prevailing
conditions and thus that the U.S. had discriminated by offering more
favorable conditions for certification to some countries than to
others. 4 The Panel then looked at whether the discrimination was
139. Id. § 609; Shrimp-Turtle II, Appellate Body, supra note 104, T 5; see Benjamin
Simmons, In Search of Balance: An Analysis of the WTO Shrimp/Turtle Appellate
Body Report, 24 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 413, 422-27 (1999) (providing an explanation of
the background of the dispute between Malaysia and the United States over the
relationship between protection of turtles and the harvesting of shrimp).
140. Shrimp-Turtle II, Appellate Body, supra note 104, T 5.
141. United States-Import Prohibition Of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products-
Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia - Report of the Panel, WT/DS58/R, T 3.1 (15
May 1998), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN-searchResult.
asp? RN=0&searchtype=browse&q I =%28@metaSymbol+WTiiDS*+and+(R+or+R
W)+and+not+(AB+or+A RB)%29+%26+%28@DocDate+>=+1 998/5/1%29+%26+
%28@Doc Date+<=+1 998/5/31 %29 [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle 1, Panel Report].
GATT Article XI forbids "prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes
or other charges... on the importation of any product of the territory of any other
contracting party." GATT, supra note 13, art. XI:I. GATT Article XX provides,
however, that a measure "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health"
may be adopted or enforced by a contracting party so long as it is not "a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination . . . or a disguised restriction on international
trade." Id. art. XX.
t42. United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
A13-1998-4. WT/DS58/AB/R, $9 184-87 (October 12, 1998), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/G EN-search Result.asp?RN=0&searchtype=browse&q I =%
28@metaSymbol+WTO DS*+and+AB+and+(R+or+ RW)%29+%26+%28@DocDat
e+>=+ 1998/10/1 %29+%26+%28@DocDate+<=+1998/10/31 %29 [hereinafter
Shrimp-Turtle 1, Appellate Body].
143. Shrimp-Turtle 11. Appellate Body, supra note 104, at VII.
144. Shrimp-Turtle I, Panel Report, supra note 141, $ 7.33; see, Joel Trachtman,
United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, § 3(b)
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justified.' In examining justification, the Panel interpreted Article
XX in terms of the overall purpose of the WTO, which is the
"promotion of economic development through trade."' Thus, the
Panel found that the most important issue for determining whether or
not exceptions from GATT are permitted under Article XX is
whether or not contested measures "undermine the WTO multilateral
trading system."' 47 Using this standard, it found that the U.S. measure
did fall into the category of "unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail" and, thus, was not
covered by the exception in Article XX. 4 The Panel, therefore, found
that the U.S. could not embargo the shrimp from non-conforming
countries."4
The Appellate Body in Shrimp I rejected the Panel's reasoning.'"
It held that whether or not a measure maintained the nature of the
WTO system should not be used as an interpretive tool for
understanding and applying Article XX.'9 ' It further held that the
Panel should first have determined whether or not any of the
exceptions under Article XX applied before analyzing the possibility
that an exception was being abused."52 The Body then noted that
because of the importance of the exception for "natural resources" in
Article XX, this exception could not be made less important than the
system of international trade, as the Panel had sought to do. 15
The Appellate Body did, however, find that the application of the
law was unjustifiable and arbitrary discrimination.14 The Appellate
Body based this decision on five factors: (1) the United States did not
attempt serious negotiations towards a multilateral agreement before
implementing sanctions, ' (2) the U.S. required that countries seeking
(1999), available at http://www.ejil.org/iournal/Vol10/Nol/sr4.rtl (last visited Apr. 8,
2003).
145. Shrimp-Turtle I, Panel Report, supra note 141, 91 7.34: Trachtman, supra note
144, § 3(h).
146. Shrinp-Turtle 1, Panel Report, supra note 141, $ 7.42: Trachtnian, supra note
144, § 3(b).
147. Shrimp-Turtle 1, Panel Report, supra note 141, $ 7.44; Trachtman, supra note
144, § 3(b).
148. Shrimp-Turtle 1, Panel Report, supra note 141, 91 7.49: Trachiman, supra note
144, § 3(b).
149. Shrimp-Turtle I, Panel Report, supra note 141, $ 7.62: Trachtman, supra note
144, § 3(b).
150. Shrimp-Turtle 1, Appellate Body, supra note 142, 91 122; Trachtman, supra
note 144, § 4(a).
151. Shrimp-Turtle 1, Appellate Body, supra note 142, 919 152-53: Trachtman,
supra note 144, § 4(a): Simmons, supra note 139, at 434-35.
152. Shrimp-Turtle 1, Appellate Body, supra note 142, 919 118-20.
153. Shrimp-Turtle I, Appellate Body, supra note 142, $9 129-31; Trachtman,
supra note 144, § 4(b).
154. Shrimp-Turtle 1, Appellate Body, supra note 142, $ 184, 186: see Varghese,
supra note 97, at 431 (citing Shrimp-Turtle 1, Panel Report, supra note 141, 91 184,
186).
155. Shrilnp-Turtle I Appellate Body, supra note 142, 91 166: Varghese, supra note
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to meet its guidelines adopt "essentially the same policy,""'5 (3) the
ban was overinclusive as it included all shrimp from the country, and
thus made no provision for importation of shrimp caught using
approved methods, 1 7 (4) the U.S. unjustifiably discriminated by
allowing certain countries a longer phase-in period than others, 5 and
(5) the certification process lacked transparency. 59  Thus, although
the Appellate Body in Shrimp I ruled against the U.S. regulatory
system, holding that it did not meet the Article XX exception, the
Body left open the possibility that a different regulatory regime could
meet GATT standards. '
After the Shrimp I Appellate Body ruling, the U.S. altered its
regulations to conform to the decision. 6 1 Malaysia again brought
charges that the new regulatory regime violated GATT, but a second
WTO Panel, using the criteria which the Shrimp I Appellate Body
had stated, found that the U.S. scheme met GATT requirements as an
exception under Article XX.1' 2
The Appellate Body in Shrimp H then upheld the second Panel's
decision, finding that by modifying its program to meet the standards
set out in Shrimp I, the U.S. regulatory system was not discriminatory
and did not violate GATT.163 The decision focused on the need for
the country seeking to prohibit imports under a regulatory scheme to
97, at 431.
156. Shrimp-Turtle I Appellate Body, supra note 142, 9$ 161 (emphasis omitted);
Varghese, supra note 97, at 431-32.
157. Shrimp-Turtle I Appellate Body, supra note 142, 9 165; Varghese, supra note
97, at 432.
158. Shrimp-Turtle I Appellate Body, supra note 142, 91 174: Varghese, supra note
97, at 432.
159. Shrimp-Turtle I Appellate Body, supra note 142, 9 183: Varghese, supra note
97, at 432.
160. Scott C. Owen, Comment, Might A Future Tuna Embargo Withstand A WTO
Challenge In Light Of The Recent Shrinip-Turtle Ruling?. 23 Hous. J. Int'l L. 123, 137(2000) (positing, after Shrimp 1, but before Shrimp II, that "[d]espite ruling against
the U.S. shrimp embargo, the Appellate Body's report offers hope that future
unilateral actions under environmental trade measures will pass WTO scrutiny" and
noting that "[tihe WTO acknowledged that the unilateral requirement of a foreign
country's adoption of environmental policies and practices could fall within the article
XX exceptions against trade restrictions if implemented on a more flexible basis than
the shrimp embargo" (citations omitted)).
161. Varghese, supra note 97, at 433 (citing Revised Guidelines for the
Implementation of Section 609 of Public Law 101-162 Relating to the Protection of
Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,946-52 (July 8,
1999)).
162. United States- Import Prohibition Of Certain Shrimp And Shrimp Products -
Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia-Report of the Panel, WT/DS58/RW, 1 5.136-
37 (June 15, 2001), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/G
EN search Result.asp? RN=0&searchtype=browse&q I = % 28@metaSymbol+WTOi DS
*+ and+(R+or+RW)+and+not+(AB+or+A RB)%29+%26+%28@DocDate+>=+200
1/6/1°/,,29+%26+%28@DocDate+<=+2001/6/30%29 [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle I,
Panel Report].
163. Shrimp-Turtle It. Appellate Body. supra note 104, $9 148. 153-54.
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show that it had made a good faith effort to pursue an agreement with
the affected country.' 4 The Appellate Body emphasized the fact that
the United States engaged in negotiations with all potentially affected
countries and had a flexible outlook.' 5 Thus, the Appellate Body
noted the importance of negotiations and emphasized that the
important question was whether the U.S. had made "comparable"
efforts to secure agreements with the different affected countries.'
The Body noted that the U.S. had used "import prohibition," which
the court termed its "heaviest 'weapon' in terms of trade measures,
without first resorting to international mechanisms for negotiating a
settlement.6 7 The Shrimp II Appellate Body, however, made it clear
that an agreement need not be concluded; the only requirement is
that negotiations proceed in good faith.16 8
Malaysia also charged that the U.S. policy resulted in arbitrary
discrimination, as it conditioned the import of shrimp on criteria that
the U.S. unilaterally imposed."' The Panel held that the Appellate
Body sought not identical standards, but rather programs
"comparable in effectiveness," which were compatible with the
chapeau of Article XX.17" Malaysia argued that the flexibility of the
"comparable in effectiveness" standard did not mitigate the fact that
the U.S. was unilaterally imposing its own standards. 7' The Appellate
Body, however, reminded Malaysia of its holding in Shrimp 1, which
stated that a common aspect of the exceptions listed in Article XX is
that they are unilaterally prescribed by the importing member.7 2
Shrimp II is very important for the comparison of privacy regimes.
Conditional access to a WTO member's market under the chapeau of
Article XX, a key difference between Shrimp I and Shrimp II, relates
directly to the issue of data privacy regulatory regimes. 173
In Shrimp /, the Panel and Body found that because the U.S.
required countries to adopt "essentially the same policies and
enforcement practices as those applied to, and enforced on, domestic
164. Id. 123.
165. Id. 91 123, 134, 140, 150.166. Id. 122.
167. Id. 91127 (citing Shrimp-Turtle 1, Appellate Body, supra note 142, 1 171).
168. Id. 124.
169. Idl. 9135.
170. Id. The chapeau of Article XX reads:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party
of measures.
GAIT, supra note 13, art. XX [hereinafter "Chapeau"l
171. Shrimp-Turtle It, Appellate Body, supra note 104,91 135.
172. Id. 137.
173. Id. 91 139: Chapeau, supra note 170.
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shrimp trawlers in the United States," the measure did not fit under
the exemption in Article XX.'74 The Appellate Body in Shrimp 11,
however, noted the flexibility of both the new measure and its
application, and thus found that the United States did not require
adoption of "essentially the same" protection as a condition of access
to its markets.7 ' The Body agreed with the Panel that "comparable in
effectiveness" was the correct standard.'76 The Body therefore held
that "there is an important difference between conditioning market
access on the adoption of essentially the same programme, and
conditioning market access on the adoption of a programme
comparable in effectiveness."'77  The Body explained that
"conditioning market access on the adoption of a programme
comparable in effectiveness, allows for sufficient flexibility in the
application of the measure so as to avoid 'arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination.""" The Body found that flexibility in this case is
shown by the facts that the "United States authorities [could] take
into account the specific conditions of Malaysian shrimp production,
and of the Malaysian sea turtle conservation programme,' 79 and that
the Department of State may determine that other manners of
harvesting, if non-threatening to turtles, may be approved.'... In
conclusion, the Appellate Body emphasized that the law was only
good as long as the United States continued good faith negotiations
toward a multilateral solution to the problem.""'
The Shrimp-Turtle cases illuminate how a panel might view the
significance of the process by which one country's regulatory
measure-which other countries allege to violate WTO rules against
discriminatior---is applied. Interference with the WTO's multilateral
aspect is not the primary factor for determining whether a measure
falls into an exception. A panel should first consider whether the law
in question is related to the purpose offered as an exception. If
determined affirmatively, as it was here, the panel next should
consider whether the applying country attempted negotiations,
although there is no requirement that the negotiations be successfully
concluded. Additionally, a panel should look to whether the country
applying the measure demands that other countries adopt the same
policy, or allows the adoption of policies comparable in
effectiveness-a sign of flexibility. Lastly, unilateral imposition of an
exception clearly may not be categorically prohibited. This is
especially so if the prohibition falls under an exception and the
174. Shrimp-Turtle II, Appellate Body, supra note 104, $ 140.
175. Id.
176. Id. 9 142.
177. Id. 9 144.
178. Id.
179. Id. 146.
180. Id. 91 146-47.
181. Id. 91153(b).
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country imposing the regulation is both flexible in applying its
regulations and enters into good faith negotiations before embargoing
the disputed products.112
4. "Like-Product" Analysis and the Comparison of Privacy Regimes
The other candidate for evaluating discrimination among privacy
regimes under the WTO is the concept of "like-product."'' 3 Although
"like-product" is a GATT standard and thus is designed for products,
it seems to be easily adaptable to services. "Like-product" requires
that products, whether domestic or imported, serving the same
purpose or offered to the same type of consumer, receive the same
regulatory and tax treatment.' Thus, the treatment of like products
under the GATT is analogous to that of the privacy regimes under
GATS. This section will examine the leading cases interpreting the
"like-product" doctrine to show how this standard is applied.
a. The Basis For "Like-Product" Analysis -Japan- Taxes
The most significant Appellate Body decision involving the
interpretation of Article III:I is Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages
("Japan-Taxes").15 The U.S. and other countries brought a complaint
under GATT because Japan had legislated a classification system for
tariff purposes under which shochu, a Japanese alcoholic beverage,
was taxed at a lower rate than vodka, which was imported."' The
Panel considered how to determine the "likeness" of products' 7-
whether, for example the Panel should examine the intent of the
government in passing the regulation -i.e., whether it was
implemented to favor domestic industry, or whether a more results-
oriented analysis should be undertaken."'
182. See supra notes 172-80 and accompanying text.
183. See generally Choi, su pra note 93; Hudec, stpra note 106: Tsai, supra note 93.
184. Japan-Taxes, supra note 106, at 15-17; see Hudec, supra note 106, at 620.
185. Japan-Taxes, supra note 106.
186. Id. at 1.
187. Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages- Report of the Panel, WT/DS8/R,
WT/DSI0/R, WT/DSll/R (July 1996). 9]1 6.14-6.23, available at http://docson
line.wto.org/GEN-searchResult.asp?RN=0&searchtype=browse&ql="/ 28@meta-Sym
hol +WTOiDS *+and+ (R+or+ RW)+ and+ novt+(A B+or+ A RB ) % 29+% 26+ /,28@ Doc Da
te+>=+1996/7/l %29+('o26+"/,,28@Doc_Date+<=+1996/7/31'"/29 1hereinafter Japan-
Taxes PanelI.
188. Id. 91[ 6.14-6.19; see getterally Tsai, supra note 93 (arguing against the
"literalist approach" and in favor of a comparison of the regulations defining the
compared products rather than looking at tax criteria and the characteristics of the
product); see also Choi, supra note 93, at I 11- 15 (explaining the difference between
the "border tax adjustment" approach. which considers the end uses of the product,
its properties, nature and quality, the tastes and habits of consumers, and the "aim
and effect" approach, a more sublective approach which looks to the perspective from
which products are compared, thus making the intent and effect of the tax or
regulation important).
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The Panel decided against using the latter standard, known as the
"aims and effects" test, and found that, because this test "conditions
likeness on the criterion whether a domestic legislation operates so as
to afford protection to domestic production, [the test] is inconsistent
with the wording of Article III:2."'Il The Panel then articulated a more
"flexible" test, which hinged upon the products' "shar[ing], apart from
commonality of end-uses, essentially the same physical
characteristics."'' The Panel then concluded that vodka and shochu
are like products.'9 '
Both Japan and the U.S. appealed the Panel decision. Japan
argued that the Panel should have considered whether the law
creating the tax on vodka had "the aim of affording protection to
domestic production.""9 2 The U.S. argued to the Appellate Body that
the Panel had erred by not considering whether a distinction in a tax
system could "afford protection to domestic production.' 9 3 The U.S.
also argued that that the Panel was incorrect when it held that
"'likeness' can be determined purely on the basis of physical
characteristics, consumer uses and tariff classification" without
looking to whether the distinction is made to protect domestic
production. 4
The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that vodka and shochu
were like products' and also agreed that the aims and effects test was
not the proper analytical tool.' Thus, their physical characteristics,
end-uses, and tariff classifications determine whether products are
"like."197
One commentator has found two differences between the "aims
and effects" test analysis and the traditional test. 9 ' The first is that
the former makes "likeness" and the actual definition of the violation
less important than the true differences between regulation and
protectionism-(1) the actual effect the measure had on trade and (2)
the authenticity of the regulatory purpose behind the measure.'99 The
second difference is that the "aims and effects" test relaxed the rigor
of the traditional analysis because it provided for an examination of
189. Japan-Taxes Panel, supra note 187, at 6.18.
190. Id. 1 6.22.
191. Id. l 6.23.
192. Japan-Taxes, supra note 106, at 3.
193. Id. at 4 (citing GATF supra note 13, art. 111).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 32.
196. Id. at 19-21.
197. Serena B. Wille, Decisions of the Appellate Body of the World Trade
Organization Recapturing a Lost Opportunity: Article 111.2 GATT 1994 Japan-Taxes
on Alcoholic Beverages 1996. 9 Eur. J. Int'l L. 182, Part III(A)(3) (1998), at
http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vo9/No 1/srl b.htnil.
198. Hudec, supra note 106, at 628.
199. Id. at 628.
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both the "regulatory justification" and the issue of violation at the
same time.2'
While the Appellate Body in Japan-Taxes found that the "aims and
effects" test should not be applied, 2' commentators posit that panels
still may apply the criteria of the "aims and effects" test when
determining the likeness of products for a national treatment
analysis. 202 The effect of a rejection of the "aims and effects" test is
that "questions of regulatory purpose [are] left.., to be raised, if at
all, as a special justification to be tested under article XX. '203 This last
distinction is important for the issue of privacy, because the argument
may be analogized to the exception in GATS Article XIV for
protection of privacy in data transmission so long as protections are
not adopted for discriminatory purposes.2'4
b. An Economic View of "Like-Product" Analysis- The Asbestos
Case
In European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products ("Asbestos"), 2 1 the Appellate Body
provided further illumination on the standard for likeness. In the
case, the question was whether France could treat Canadian cement
containing asbestos differently from domestic, asbestos-free cement.'
The Appellate Body began its review of the Panel's finding that the
two cements were "like" products with a dictionary definition of
"like," noting that "'like' products are products that share a number
of identical or similar characteristics or qualities."2  It noted,
however, that this definition did not determine the characteristics
which are important in determining "likeness," clarify the degree or
extent to which qualities must be shared to be held "like," or state the
perspective from which "likeness" must be viewed.2""
While citing Japan-Taxes for the general proposition that the
purpose of Article III is to ensure that internal taxes and regulations
do not unfairly protect domestic production, the Body held that "a
determination of 'likeness' under Article 111:4 is, fundamentally, a
determination about the nature and extent of a competitive
200. Id.
201. See Baker, et al., supra note 15, at 14 (noting that the Appellate Body in
Japan-Taxes held "that the term 'like product' as used in [GATT] article 111:2 should
be construed narrowly on a case-by-case basis" and found that while tariff
classification could aid in determining whether products were similar, common end
uses and identical physical characteristics were also important criteria).
202. Hudec, supra note 106, at 634.
203. Id. at 636.
204. GATS, supra note 14, art. XIV(c)(ii).
205. Asbestos, supra note 108.
206. Id. 33, 192.
207. Id. $l 90-91.
208. Id. $ 92.
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relationship between and among products. '219 It also noted that the
concept of "likeness" must be applied on an individual, case-by-case
basis.21" The four criteria which the Body recognized were: physical
properties of the products, end-uses of the products, consumers' tastes
and habits, and tariff classification of the products.21'
The Appellate Body found that the Panel had incorrectly relied on
only one of these criteria.1 2 The Body found that the physical
properties of the product (such as the presence of a toxic substance
such as asbestos) are important to consider and that this analysis
cannot be absorbed into the broader analysis of the end uses.213
Additionally, the fact that two products have the same end-use does
not mean that they have identical or similar properties. 2 4 The Body
held that two products which have different health risks are, by
definition, not identical in terms of physical properties.215 It further
commented on the importance of the second and third criteria as aids
in determining competitiveness in the market. If products do not
compete, a country cannot impose internal regulations to protect
domestic production. 2" The Appellate Body found that the Panel had
examined the criterion of end-uses inadequately because it had only
looked at a few cases in which the products had similar end-uses and,
furthermore, had neglected to analyze cases in which the products had
different end-uses.217
The Appellate Body also faulted the Panel for ignoring the third
criterion: consumer tastes.21 While the Panel found that this criterion
would not provide clear results, the Appellate Body observed that
consumer tastes and preferences are important in a case when
physical properties are different. The Body stated that:
[C]onsumers' tastes and habits regarding fibres, even in the case of
commercial parties, such as manufacturers, are very likely to be
shaped by the health risks associated with a product which is known
to be highly carcinogenic. A manufacturer cannot, for instance,
ignore the preferences of the ultimate consumer of its products. 219
The Appellate Body refused to accept Canada's contention that
where regulatory barriers have disturbed "normal conditions of
209. Id. 97-99.
210. Id. T 101.
211. Id.
212. Id. 109.
213. Id. 9 111.
214. Id. T 112.
215. Id. T 114.
216. Id. T 117.
217. Id. $ 119.
218. Id. 9T 117, 120-25.
219. Id. T 122 (emphasis omitted).
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competition," the tastes and behaviors of consumers are not
relevant.21
The Appellate Body thus reversed the Panel's decision that the two
types of fibers are like products because the Panel had not adequately
analyzed the four criteria. 2 The Appellate Body in the Asbestos case
seemed to be calling for an exclusively or fundamentally economic
view of like products under Article 111:4 of GATT.222
11. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SAFE HARBOR AND THE EUROPEAN
PRIVACY DIRECTIVE, AND THE FORM THAT A GATS DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT CASE MIGHT TAKE
In a hypothetical situation before the WTO, Hungary or Australia
could bring a dispute settlement case against the EU, alleging that the
EU had set higher standards for them than for the U.S. These
countries represent two different categories of member states that
might have a colorable complaint about their treatment by EU
regulators. Hungary is an EU-aspirant that successfully received a
categorization of adequacy for its privacy regime. 22  Australia is
currently in negotiations with the EU seeking a rating of adequacy.224
This section will analyze the hypothetical Dispute Settlement Case
that these countries might bring.
A. Hungary: Achieving a Rating of "Adequate" Through Strict
Compliance with the Requirements of the European Privacy Directive
Hungary had to meet an extensive and rigorous set of procedures in
order to receive a rating of adequate from the European Parliament
commission which investigates privacy regimes. 225 Hungary would
thus have grounds to allege either that its companies were treated
unfairly in comparison to similar American companies, which merely
had to accede to the Safe Harbor standards, or that the EU's
standards for the U.S. were not comparable in effectiveness to those
220. Id. 9 123.
221. Id. 'lJIi 125-26.
222. See id. 1 154.
223. The fact that Hungary is an EU aspirant is important as it may be the case that
some o1 the modifications to its laws regarding privacy were made 1o contorm to EU
entrance requirements, rather than to requirements of' the European Privacy
Directive.
224. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 3/2001 on the Level of Protection
ot the Australian Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000, 5095/00/EN (2001),
available at http://curopa .eu.in t/comnm/iiternal market/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2001
/wp40en.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2003) hereinafter Working Party on Australian
Privacy].
225. Commission Decision, European Parliament and of the Council on the
Adequate Protection of Personal Data Provided in Hungary, (2000) available at
tittp://europa.eu.int/comi/internatlnmarket/en/dataprot/adequacy/hu-00-519-en.pdif
1hereinafter Commission Decision on Hungary].
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imposed on Hungary. Both American and Hungarian companies are
service providers seeking to send data from the EU to their respective
home country offices.
In the first case, the American company would have signed up for
Safe Harbor,22 €' thereby meeting the criteria discussed in Part I of this
Note.227 Safe Harbor also would have allowed the American company
to disregard some protections required by the European Parliament
Report on the Draft Commission Decision.228
The Hungarian company, however, would not be allowed to
disregard these protections. The language of the Commission
Decision of 26 July 2000 explicitly states that Hungary must meet the
requirements of the European Directive. 229  The Commission
Decision also provides that "competent authorities" in member states
may suspend flows of data to Hungary if there are "reasonable
grounds" to believe that the Hungarian authority is not enforcing its
privacy laws adequately. 230 Additionally, the Decision mentions the
need for member countries to inform one another if Hungarian
agencies responsible for enforcing these rules are unable to secure
compliance. 23 The Decision even includes the possibility of rescission
of the adequacy ruling itself if enforcement is deemed to be
inadequate.232
Hungarian privacy laws provide for enforcement by judicial
remedy, including compensation.233 Article 59 of the Hungarian
Constitution assures privacy protection for the processing of personal
data and provides various sectorial laws that protect this personal data
in other areas.2 34 Thus, the process which Hungary had to undergo
and the requirements to which it acceded are much more rigorous
than those for the U.S. under Safe Harbor.
226. Had the American company not signed up for Safe Harbor, it theoretically
should not have been allowed to send the data from the EU to the U.S., and the issue
might be one of enforcement. European Privacy Directive, supra note 1, ch. IV, art.
25 9 1, 2 (requiring that data transfers can be made only to third countries having
"adequate levelis] of protection" and that member states prevent data transfers to
countries not meeting these adequate standards of protection).
227. See Safe Harbor, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
228. See Parliament Report, supra note 48.
229. Commission Decision on Hungary, supra note 225.
230. See id. art. 3.
231. Id. art. 3, I(b).
232. Id. art. 3, T 4.
233. Id. pmbl. T 8.
234. Id. pmbl. $ 6.
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B. Australia: Still Seeking Approval Despite Higher Levels of Data
Protection than the U.S. and Greater Compliance with the European
Privacy Directive
The EU also has been evaluating Australia's level of adequacy, but
has not yet granted an approval rating." 5  The Article 29 Data
Protection Working Party published findings in January of 2001 which
included criticisms of Australia's privacy regime. 23" These criticisms
included the fact that "some sectors and activities are excluded from
the protections of the [Australian Privacy] Act. '237  Among small
businesses, only those sectors "deemed to pose a high risk to privacy"
must meet the requirements of the Privacy Act.23 The Working Party
noted that this qualification had the potential for causing
uncertainty. 239  The Working Party also noted problems with
exemptions for both certain types of employee data and publicly
available data.241' Additionally, organizations may inform data
subjects of collection of data pertaining to them after the collection, as
opposed to before, as required by the European Privacy Directive. 24'
The Working Party found other inadequacies. These include: lack
of opt-out provisions for individuals facing direct marketing,22 no
prohibition on other uses of sensitive data collected for legitimate
purposes, 243 no mechanism for preventing interference with the
privacy of EU citizens who are not Australian residents, 244 and no
means to prohibit onward transfers of data imported into Australia
from third countries. 245 Because of these insufficiencies, the Working
Party found that Australia's National Privacy Principles were not
adequate. 24
The testimony of Peter Ford at the Conference and Report on the
Implementation of Directive 95/46/EC made apparent the importance
of the EU's treatment of Australia for the issue of comparing data
privacy regimes under the WTO.24 7 Mr. Ford first noted that "the
235. Working Party on Australian Privacy, supra note 224.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.; European Privacy Directive, supra note 1, 39.
242. Working Party on Australian Privacy, supra note 224.
243. Id.
244. 1d.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Peter Ford, First Assistant Secretary Information and Security Law Division
Attorney-General's Department, Australia, Implementing the Data Protection
Directive-An Outside Perspective (30 Sep - 1 Oct 2002), available at:
http://europa.eu.int/conimn/internal m-arket/en/dataprot/lawreport/speeches/ford-en.p
df (last visited, Mar. 13, 2003) Ihereinafter Ford Testimony]. Mr. Ford testified that:
Itjhe accommodation reached between the United States and Europe in the
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Australian approach is to set minimum standards and allow industry,
if it so wishes, to develop its own codes which must be approved by
the Privacy Commissioner if they are to operate in place of the
statutory standards.""24 He stated that Australia was following one of
the Working Party's recommendations by adding a remedy to
violations of data privacy of non-Australians, although he testified
that the only issue was enforcement as the law already protected the
privacy of this group.249
In relation to the Working Party's disagreement with the exclusion
for secondary uses of publicly available information, he noted that "it
is difficult to imagine what useful purpose might be served by a
requirement for a right of access to a document which is already
publicly available.""25 " Mr. Ford also stated that "[t]he Australian
Government has excluded from the ambit of the legislation only those
small businesses that pose no threat or low threat to privacy" in
response to the criticisms of the exception for small businesses."'
As a way to distinguish between those issues which threaten privacy
and those which do not, Mr. Ford emphasized that the legislation
"ensure[s] that businesses that trade in personal information are
denied the benefit of the small business exemption and are covered by
the Act."2 2 He continued, stating that the Working Party's objection
to allowing direct marketers one chance to reach target customers
before these customers had the chance to opt out was a "mere
quibble." '253 Mr. Ford pointed out that "[t]his is an area where the test
imposed on Australia also seems to be more restrictive than that
imposed on the US." '254  He noted that under Safe Harbor,
"information may be collected for the primary purpose of direct
marketing without first obtaining consent." '255 He extended this
comparison to Safe Harbor in the area of notice, remarking that the
Working Party on Australian Privacy had criticized the fact that the
'US Safe Harbor Principles' seemed, at first, to indicate a measure of
flexibility on the part of the Commission; however, our experience has been
that what is acceptable from the US will not necessarily be accepted from
other countries .... The other objectionable feature ... is an excessively
regulatory approach flowing from a tendency to use the Directive as a
template for the laws of non-EU countries.
Id. at 1.
248. Id. at 5.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 6.
251. Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted) (offering as an example "the local butcher [who]
may hold personal information about some of his/her customers solely for the
purpose of satisfying customer needs or for billing purposes").
252. Id. at 10.
253. Id. at II (arguing that "it is legitimate for the EU to say what it requires by
way of protection of European data, [but] it is surely a matter for third party
countries to say how they will provide such protection").
254. Id. at 11.
255. Id.
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Australian law allowed notice to be given as soon as practicable after
the data collection, if it is not possible to give notice before or
concurrent to the collection.2 16  He argued, however, that the
Australian law provides a level of protection equal to that which the
EU found sufficient in the Safe Harbor Agreement.2 7
In his conclusion, Mr. Ford asserted that Australia has "been
treated differently from the US .... [I]t is possible under the 'Safe
Harbor principles' for US companies to disregard the Directive in
relation to generally available publications that contain only US data.
No such principle has been recognised for Australia. '25 ' Australia
thus presents a troubling case in which a rating of adequacy has been
denied based upon failure to satisfy requirements which the U.S. was
not obligated to meet under Safe Harbor.
III. APPLYING THE STANDARD OF "COMPARABLE IN
EFFECTIVENESS," A PANEL WOULD FIND THAT THE EU FAVORED
THE UNITED STATES IN VIOLATION OF WTO RULES
This part discusses the concepts and decisions introduced in Part I
and applies them to the conflict introduced in Part II. It then
concludes that the correct standard for evaluating whether a privacy
regulatory regime is discriminatory is that of "comparable in
effectiveness," as elucidated by the Appellate Body in Shrimp-Turtle
II.
A. The "Comparable in Effectiveness" Standard from Shrimp-Turtle 1I
Is the Proper Standard for Evaluating Privacy Regulatory Regimes
Any panel charged with examining allegations that the EU had
discriminated against other countries by favoring the U.S. in an
evaluation of privacy regimes would make use of the four cases just
examined in Part I. From Bananas, a panel would note the need to
evaluate the case under GATS,21' and the importance of equal levels
of competition, rather than formal identity in regimes. It would also
have to acknowledge the "like-product" evaluation, used by the
Panels and Appellate Bodies in Japan-Taxes and Asbestos, including
the need to look to the formal characteristics and end-uses of the
service, rather than to its effect on competition. Nevertheless, a panel
would find this standard incomplete, as it does not offer proper
evaluative tools for comparing privacy regimes.26 "
256. Id.; see Working Party on Australian Privacy, supra note 224.
257. See Ford Testimony, supra note 247, at II (citing Safe Harbor, supra note 3, at
FAQ 15).
258. 1(. at 14.
259. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
260. See infra notes 267-71 and accompanying text.
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The panel would find that the most relevant standard comes from
Shrimp Turtle II. Under the "comparable in effectiveness" standard,
the Panel must look to whether a regulatory regime under which one
country sought to embargo products of another comes within an
exception to the GATS prohibition against product/service
embargos. 21  The panel would have to examine whether the
restriction is arbitrary or unjustified discrimination, or a disguised
restriction on trade. 2 The Panel would also need to look to whether
the embargoing country sought to impose the exact same regulatory
regime or merely one that was equally effective, whether the country
applied the same standards to all countries, and whether it had
entered into good faith negotiations.
1. The "Treatment No Less Favorable" Standard, as Elaborated by
the Panel in Bananas, Does Not Provide Sufficient Criteria for
Evaluating Potentially Discriminatory Treatment of Privacy Regimes
The Bananas case is important for the panel in its evaluation as it
specifies the relevance of GATS,2 4 and shows the broad application
of GATS to disputes over the supply of services.265 Secondly, the
"treatment no less favorable" standard, as developed in Bananas,
demands a level playing field. As developed in that case, the standard
indicates that discrimination might still exist even if the differential
treatment offered to Australian companies, vis-gi-vis the American
companies, caused no change in the Australians' market share.
This standard draws its significance for the instant case from the
fact that it deals directly with a comparison of regulatory regimes.
Bananas holds that, while a regulatory regime may not formally
discriminate between foreign and domestic service providers,
discrimination may exist if the former are not given the same
261. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
264. Bananas, supra note 100, at 7.285 (holding that "It]he scope of the GATS
encompasses any measure of a Member to the extent it affects the supply of a service
regardless of whether such measure directly governs the supply of a service or
whether it regulates other matters but nevertheless affects trade in services").
265. See supra notes 109-18 and accompanying text. Appellate Body decisions
have rejected any narrow reading of "affecting" and have found that this term "does
not convey any notion of limiting the scope of GATS to certain types of measures or
to a certain regulatory domain." Werner Zdouc, WTO Dispute Settlement Practice
Relating to the GATS, 2 J. Int'l Econ. L. 295, 318, 320 (1999) (arguing that "no
measures are excluded a priori from the scope of the GATS, which encompassed any
measure of a Member to the extent it affects the supply of a service, regardless of
whether such measure directly governs the supply of a service, or whether it regulates
other matters but nevertheless affects trade in services"); see Swire & Litan, supra
note 86, at 190, 194-95 (arguing that in the context of the European Privacy Directive
that regulation of a privacy regime would fit under GATS and would depend upon
how narrowly or broadly a WTO Panel interpreted the privacy exception in Article
XIV).
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conditions of competition, even if there was no significant change in
market share.
In the end, however, the "treatment no less favorable" standard, as
elucidated by the Bananas Panel, does not offer a complete
framework for comparing the different privacy regulatory regimes. In
the hypothetical case under consideration, a panel would need
guidance to deal with the question of whether the exception for
privacy in GATS XlV 26 will affect a ruling on discrimination. The
Panel would also need guidance on the role that the different sets of
negotiations play in deciding the merits of the different regulatory
regimes.
2. The "Like-Product" Standard Involves a Comparison of the End
Uses or Characteristics of the Privacy Regimes
The panel might try to apply the standard of "like-product" as
developed in Japan-Taxes and Asbestos. The Japan-Taxes Appellate
Body interpreted "like-product" to depend on the sharing of similar
end uses or characteristics."'7 The Body rejected the aims and effects
test and the need for examining the regulatory purpose." ' Thus, if a
panel were to follow the Japan-Taxes decision, it would look only to
the explicit characteristics of the privacy regimes, rather than to the
purpose of the regulation or whether it was enacted for a
discriminatory purpose.
One reason that a WTO Panel would not use the "like-product"
standard is the difficulty inherent in analogizing between the items
compared in Japan- Taxes--distilled liquors-and those being
compared in the hypothetical case-privacy regimes. One could try to
determine whether or not the different privacy regimes are "like,"
based upon whether or not they have similar end uses or physical
characteristics. The "like-product" test was developed, however, for
more readily measured products or services. In judging whether there
has been discrimination against a foreign "like-product" or service, in
most cases it is necessary to examine the relevant regulatory measures
or tax measures. ' This is true under both the traditional and the
"aims or effects" tests.27 "Like-product" could be analogized to a like
service-for example, if one were comparing treatment of foreign and
domestic insurance providers in the EU. However, neither Japan-
266. GATS, supra note 14, art. XIV(c)(ii).
267 See supra notes 185-97 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 185-97 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 165-81 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 165-81 and accompanying text: see Hudec, supra note 106, at
635 (arguing that the aims and effects test has been applied to "the WTO's policing
function over domestic regulatory measures" and will continue to be so applied,
although WTO panels and appellate bodies do so without admitting what they are
doing).
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Taxes nor Asbestos offers any insight into the aspects which must be
evaluated in order to judge whether a regulatory regime, under which
a country seeks to ban imports of a product or a service of another
country, is discriminatory.27'
3. A WTO Dispute Panel Would Use the Standard of "Comparable
in Effectiveness" in Evaluating Whether Safe Harbor Violates WTO
Principles
A panel examining the issue would use the "comparable in
effectiveness" standard because this standard allows an evaluation of
whether a regulatory regime may distinguish treatment of products or
services from different countries and how it may do So.272
The Appellate Bodies in Shrimp-Turtle I and Shrimp-Turtle H
created a framework that is applicable to the hypothetical posed
here.27 Under GATT XI, countries cannot impose prohibitions and
restrictions except through duties.274 This ban can be analogized to a
prohibition or restriction on transfers of data. GATT XI also lists
exceptions to the prohibition on quantitative restrictions, 25 as does
GATS for protection of privacy.27('  The imposition of these
prohibitions and restrictions is subject to the exceptions given in
GATT XX, so long as the exceptions are not used for "arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries. 27
4. A Panel Would Find Safe Harbor To Be a Violation Under the
Appropriate Standard of "Comparable in Effectiveness"
The "comparable in effectiveness" standard, as articulated by the
Shrimp-Turtle II Appellate Body, provides criteria for deciding
whether a country's regulatory regime arbitrarily or unjustifiably
discriminates against the regulatory regime of another country. The
different standards and methods used by the EU in certifying regimes
for regulating privacy-that of the U.S. as opposed to those of
Hungary and Australia-as well as the difference in format and
results of the EU-U.S. negotiations on privacy regulatory regimes,
would support a finding that the EU discriminated against Hungary
and Australia in violation of WTO standards.
271. One other possibility, an examination of which would go beyond the contours
of this Note, for the differential treatment given to the U.S. has to do with politics and
economic power. The involvement of these other factors would require an evaluatory
framework which considers political pressures, among other factors. The "like-
product" test is much too limited even to attempt to examine these factors.
272. See supra notes 132-81 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 132-81 and accompanying text.
274. GATT, supra note 13, art. XI.
275. Id.
276. GATS, supra note 14, art. XIV(c)(ii).
277. GATT, supra note 13, art. XX.
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B. The Safe Harbor Violates the WTO
1. The Shrimp-Turtle II Elements Favor Finding a Violation of WTO
Principles
The Shrimp-Turtle II Appellate Body provided certain elements for
consideration when determining whether discrimination is allowed or
whether it is arbitrary, unjustifiable or a disguised restriction on
trade.27' The issue in Shrimp-Turtle was analogous to the issue of data
transmissions and privacy: the U.S. justified its embargo on
allegations that Malaysia did not meet U.S. standards for catching
shrimp, just as in the hypothetical the EU threatens to suspend data
transmissions because it alleges that protections offered by some
countries are inadequate under the EU's own standards.
Applying the Shrimp-Turtle II criteria to this hypothetical, a panel
should consider whether the EU made comparable efforts to secure
agreements, whether the EU used its "heaviest weapon" without
negotiating first,2 7' and whether the EU differentiated among
countries in its treatment. The Appellate Body in Shrimp-Turtle II
also observed that market access cannot be judged completely by the
adoption (or non-adoption) of essentially the same program. 1
In the hypothetical case, the EU is regulating privacy just as the
U.S. regulated the environment in the Shrimp-Turtle cases. Both
measures have extraterritorial effects. Both ostensibly could violate
the GATT article forbidding prohibitions on the importation of
products or services.2"' Both also arguably fall under exceptions. 2 2 In
both cases there is a factual question as to the issue of comparable
treatment of different countries: U.S. negotiations, or lack thereof,
with certain countries on agreements for TED's and EU negotiations,
or lack thereof, with certain countries on agreements for certifying
privacy protections for data communications.
In Shrimp-Turtle I, the Appellate Body held that the U.S. was
wrong in applying different standards to different countries.2s
Therefore, it held that the U.S. could not embargo shrimp from
countries with systems which were equally effective, but not identical,
to its own. 284 This situation is similar to that of the EU and its
enforcement of the privacy regimes. By analogy, the EU should not
278. See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
279. Shrimp-Turtle 11, Appellate Body, supra note 104, $ 127 (citing Shrimp-Turtle
1, Appellate Body, supra note 142, at 171).
280. Id. 9 140.
281. GATE, supra note 13, art. X1. GATE only applies to products, but decisions
such as those in the Bananas case have analogized GAT' provisions to services.
282. GATE, supra note 13, art. XX (on health): GATS, supra note 14, art.
XIV(c)(ii) (on privacy).
283. See Shrimp-Turtle 1, Appellate Body, supra note 142, [19 173-75.
284. See supra notes 150-59 and accompanying text.
2816 [Vol. 71
THE SAFE HARBOR AGREEMENT
be allowed to stop transmissions from EU countries to countries with
equally effective, identical systems.
Although the EU itself has not prohibited any transmissions or
issued a credible threat to cease transmissions immediately, member
countries have done so on two different occasions."' While the EU
has entered into negotiations with countries seeking adequacy ratings,
there are serious questions as to whether all countries have been
treated equally in these negotiations.2 16 While Shrimp-Turtle II does
not require successful negotiations, it does require that parties
negotiate in good faiths.2 " There is a credible question as to whether
the negotiations with Australia have been conducted under this
standard of good faith in that demands were made of Australia that
were not required of the United States.88
2. The Differential Treatment of the U.S. as Opposed to Hungary
and Australia Argues in Favor of a WTO Violation
In our hypothetical, Hungary and Australia argue that the Safe
Harbor regime, adopted by the U.S. in agreement with the EU, is not
comparable in effectiveness to that which the EU applies either to its
own member states or to other third countries. Both countries'
extensive efforts to qualify,289 as well as comparisons between their
standards and those of the U.S. under Safe Harbor,29 support this
argument. Other considerations include the allegations that U.S.
companies (and by extension the U.S.) are not complying with Safe
Harbor 2 1 1 or the weaker standards of Safe Harbor,2 2 and the fact that
the EU has taken only a few, very weak actions in response to
inadequate enforcement by the U.S.2 3 Thus, the fact that the Safe
Harbor Agreement required less of the U.S. than the EU required of
285. In 1995, the Swedish Data Inspection Board held that American Airlines
could not transfer personal data on Swedish citizens from Sweden to the U.S.
Summary of the Decision by the Lower Courts on American Airlines, Inc. v. Swedish
Data Inspection Board, at http://www.privacyexchange.org/legal/swedishcase.html; see
James J. Dillon, et al., In Practice E-Comnerce Minimizes the Risks of Privacy
Violations When Operating E-Conunerce Websites, 169 N.J. L.J. 1143 (2002), available
at http://www.goodwinprocter.com/publications/dillon-hildebrandklosek 09 16 0
2.pdf.
In 1999, "Microsoft paid $60(.000 to settle charges brought by Spain that
Microsoft didn't 'clearly and conspicuously' disclose to Spanish consumers what
happens to personal data when they register for Windows." Ted Kemp, Privacy Rules
Cross the Pond, at http://www.internctweek.com/newslead0 I /lead071601 .htm (July 16,
2000).
286. See supra notes 225-58 and accompanying text.
287. Shrimp-Turtle 11, Appellate Body, supra note 104, $ 123.
288. See supra notes 235-46 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 229-46 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 56-71 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
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Hungary and Australia, and that the U.S. has not fully met even these
weaker standards, supports a finding that the EU's actions violate the
WTO.
3. The Difference in the Format and Results of the EU-U.S.
Negotiations Vis-,A-Vis Those with Hungary and Australia Is Further
Evidence of a Violation
Another key argument in favor of finding a WTO violation is that
both the form and the result of the EU's negotiations with the U.S.
were different from EU negotiations with other countries." 4 A
counter-argument, however, would posit that good faith
negotiations 25 could be interpreted to include a good faith effort to
recognize the cultural and political differences of the party with which
the EU is negotiating.29 ' The EU could argue that its approach to the
U.S. was based on this idea as it was clear that the U.S. was not going
to change its privacy laws to meet the exact wording of the European
Privacy Directive.2 7
This reasoning would, however, overstate the term "flexibility."
The idea of flexibility in the case had to do with allowing for different
approaches to the regulatory regime,29' not to allowing one country to
have its own separate agreement, exempting it from provisions which
others were required to follow. Nothing in Shrimp-Turtle suggests
that flexibility means allowing a country to receive treatment not
offered to another based on the fact that without such special
treatment the country would not abide by the regulations.
294. See Europa-Internal Markety: Data Protection: Commission Decisions on
the Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data in Third Countries, at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/privacy/adequacy)en.htm (last visited
Mar. 26, 2003) (noting that "ltlhe Council and the European Parliament have given
the Commission the power to determine, on the basis of Article 25.6 of directive
95/46/EC whether a third country ensures an adequate level of protection by reason
of its domestic law or of the international commitments it has entered into ... land
thatl Itihe Commission has so far recognised lonlyl Switzerland, Hungary and the US
Department of Commerce's Safe Harbor Privacy Principles as providing adequate
protection"). No other country has been offered an individual agreement similar to
that offered to the U.S. under Safe Harbor.
295. The Appellate Body held that the U.S. had to negotiate in good faith in order
to try to reach an agreement on the TED's before prohibiting shrimp from the
country accused of improper shrimp harvesting. Shrimp-Turtle II, Appellate Body,
supra note 104, $ 123.
296. This is based on the idea that the Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body decisions
allow for flexibility and that countries did not have to adopt the same program as the
U.S., only one that was comparable in effectiveness. id. q1 144.
297. There was tremendous resistance to the much weaker standards of the Safe
Harbor Agreement. See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
298. Shrimp-Turtle II, Appellate Body, supra note 104, 9$ 40, 144.
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C. The U.S. Privacy Regime Under Safe Harbor Is Not Comparable in
Effectiveness to the Privacy Regimes of Other Countries Which Have
Met the Adequacy Standard of the European Privacy Directive
The only question remaining is whether the privacy regime that the
EU accepted was actually comparable in effectiveness. Based upon
the Parliament Report on Draft Commission Decision discussing
shortcomings of the resulting regime, '9 and the testimony of privacy
experts,3 ... the answer seems to be that Safe Harbor is not
''comparable in effectiveness," neither to the European Privacy
Directive nor to the standards required of other aspirants to an
adequacy rating.'. Thus, although the EU has negotiated with all
countries, the preferential treatment accorded to the U.S. by the EU
constitutes treatment that is not "comparable in effectiveness."
A final argument in favor of the EU's position is that the WTO case
would be premature, as neither Australia nor Hungary has suffered an
interruption of its data transmissions. However, both the willingness
of member countries to cut off transmissions to non-complying
countries and the fact that they have done so3" 2 make it clear that a
country which has neither a rating of adequacy nor a program similar
to Safe Harbor is at risk of data interruptions. Thus, both Hungary
and Australia can allege that they had no choice but to meet the
stricter requirements based on a credible threat.
The strongest argument for finding a violation of the standard of
"comparable in effectiveness" is that Safe Harbor simply does not
work, either because of a lack of willpower on the part of the U.S.
agencies responsible for enforcing it, or because of fundamental flaws
in the Agreement itself.3"3 The EU offered the U.S. much less
rigorous terms and Safe Harbor requires much less of the U.S. than
the EU required of Hungary or is requiring of Australia. "'4 Although
there is no requirement that the U.S. adopt the European Privacy
Directive word for word, in order to avoid having data transmissions
from the EU cut off, it should have been required to develop an
equally effective regime.
In the Shrimp-Turtle cases, the U.S. had a regulatory scheme under
which it cut off imports to certain countries based upon their failure to
meet its standards."" The Appellate Body in Shrimp-Turtle II allowed
the U.S. practice because the U.S. negotiated in good faith and made
299. See Parliament Report, supra note 48, at 8-10.
300. See Reidenberg Testimony, supra note 45.
301. See supra notes 4-6,229-46 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 56-84 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 225-58 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
306. Shrimp-Turtle I|, Appellate Body, supra note 104, l 5.
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allowances for alternative regimes which were equally effective." 7
Additionally, in that case, the U.S. did not overtly hold certain
countries to higher standards, nor did it reach written agreements
which effectively allowed those countries to meet lower standards or
to avoid requirements.3 0
The EU, on the other hand, has manifestly treated the U.S.
preferentially, signing a written agreement that holds the U.S. to a
lower standard than that required of other countries and exempting it
from certain requirements of the European Privacy Directive to which
other countries are held.3 '9 These actions cannot be accounted for by
stating merely that the EU has been "flexible" in its negotiations.
Nothing short of political expediency can account for the fact that the
U.S. has been treated so favorably. The EU could not afford the
econonic damage that blocking transmissions to the U.S. would
cause, 3 0 nor was it in a position to dominate the U.S. economically the
way that it could other countries, such as Australia and Hungary.?
Finally, the fact that Australia still has not been granted a rating of
adequacy, despite passage of its Data Privacy Act, which meets higher
restrictions than the U.S. Safe Harbor,1 2 further illustrates the double
standard used by the EU.
CONCLUSION
A panel would use the "comparable in effectiveness" standard in
evaluating whether or not the EU is violating WTO rules by offering a
different standard for the U.S. privacy regime vis- -vis the privacy
regimes of other countries. This standard was used in an analogous
situation in the Shrimp-Turtle case, -13  and the Bananas case
demonstrates that methodologies developed for products under the
GATT can be applied to services under the GATS.314 Although "like-
product", as developed in Japan-Taxes and Asbestos, offers a
methodology for comparing treatment of similar foreign and domestic
products, this standard is insufficient to compare the treatment of
privacy regulatory regimes.1
307. Id. 1 9 123, 134, 140, 150.
308. See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 56-68, 229-46 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (suggesting that the possible
economic damage from cutting off data transmissions would be more than $350
billion).
311. Hungary's position is even more delicate as it was a candidate for admission to
the EU while the adequacy rating negotiations were occurring.
312. See Ford Testimony, supra note 247 (noting that the Australian Privacy Act
meets the OECD requirements and includes protections not required of the U.S.
under Safe Harbor).
313. See supra notes 132-81 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 109-18 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
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When the standards of the Shrimp-Turtle cases are applied to a
hypothetical complaint brought by Australia and Hungary, a number
of important conclusions can be made. First, the EU did not enter
into good faith negotiations with all countries that might be
candidates for having data transmissions interrupted. Second, the
treatment accorded to the United States through the Safe Harbor
Agreement is favorable in comparison to the treatment afforded
Hungary and Australia. Additionally, the credible threat of
interruptions of transmissions, made manifest by the actions of
Sweden and Spain, shows that the countries that met the more
rigorous standards than those offered to the U.S. did so because of
EU pressure, which in itself was discriminatory in nature, because the
same pressure was not used against the U.S. Finally, the EU's
different approaches to negotiations with the U.S. as compared to
Hungary and Australia cannot be summarized accurately as based
upon flexibility. A flexible approach would have allowed different
solutions to reach the same level of protection without requiring
identical privacy laws. As this Note has shown, the privacy regime
that the EU rejected from Australia complied at least as closely, and
probably more closely, with the European Privacy Directive than did
the privacy regime which the EU accepted from the U.S.
One possibility-not discussed by this Note-is that this different
treatment stems from political factors, such as the greater political and
economic power that the U.S. wields compared to Australia. In any
case, this different treatment does not result from an exception which
might be legitimate under the WTO, such as respect for cultural and
historical differences." ' A WTO panel would thus find that the EU
had violated its WTO commitments.
316. See Shrimp-Turtle 11, Appellate Body, supra note 104, [ 40 (noting that the
Appellate Body in Shrimp-Turtle / had criticized U.S. law requiring the TED's,
because it did not "allow for flexibility in the consideration of different conditions
that may exist in different harvesting nations").
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